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Is Money No Object: Can the 
Government Rely on Financial 
Considerations Under Charter 
Section 1 ?   
Robert E. Charney* 
Daniel Guttman** 
It is not the abolition of public schools, but it is their increase, at 
enormous cost, that is likely to trouble future generations, as it does some 
of them who are of the present generation.  
— Meredith C.J.C.P. in Ottawa Separate School Trustees v. City of 
Ottawa.1 
I. GOVERNMENT BENEFITS: AN INTRODUCTION 
In recent years a vast array of government programs have been chal-
lenged as being inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms.2 A common ground of attack is that a specific benefit pro-
gram offered is under-inclusive in that it is extended inappropriately to a 
limited number of beneficiaries. An alternative ground often advanced is 
that the benefit granted by the program is set at an insufficient level. 
Thus, the question of whether governments should be able to rely on 
funding considerations to justify under-inclusive programs that give rise 
                                                                                                                                
*  General Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney Gen-
eral. 
**  Counsel, Constitutional Law Branch, Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. The 
views expressed in this article are the authors’, and do not purport to represent the position of 
the Ministry except where indicated. Bruce Ellis, an articling student at the Constitutional 
Law Branch, assisted in the preparation of this paper. 
1   (1915), 24 D.L.R. 497, at 503 (per Meredith C.J.C.P.). 
2  Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 
1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
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to discrimination under the Charter is a question of fundamental impor-
tance.  
This paper explores the important question of to what extent the 
Charter and courts should determine how government allocates finite 
resources in a world of infinite need. Every service the government 
offers could be improved and expanded if additional resources could be 
added. It is no surprise when every government commission or commit-
tee investigating discrete services like health, education, environment, 
social services and justice recommends that additional resources be 
provided to improve the particular service being considered.  But the 
obvious reality is that governments have limited budgets to work with 
and face very difficult decisions in determining budget allocations. The 
courts are not responsible for allocating government resources. How-
ever, they are continually faced with arguments from applicants that a 
specific program or group of beneficiaries is entitled to a greater share 
of government resources. Thus, courts are often called upon to consider 
a government argument that budgetary restraints justify a limit or al-
leged deficiency in the benefit program offered.  
In this paper, we first consider the recent case of Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin,3 where the government of 
Nova Scotia attempted to rely on financial considerations in its section 1 
analysis. A reading of this case makes it apparent that the Supreme 
Court has left open the question of whether and to what extent govern-
ments seeking to justify under section 1 programs found to infringe the 
Charter can and should be able to rely on budgetary and other financial 
considerations. As explained in this paper the answer will depend upon 
the future direction taken by the Court in its section 15 analysis. Clearly, 
budgetary considerations “in and of themselves” should not be permit-
ted to justify classic cases of direct discrimination. No one would sug-
gest, for example, that the government could justify the provision of 
financial benefits exclusively to men on the sole ground that it would 
cost too much to extend an equal benefit to women. As long as section 
15 is limited to cases where the government makes the initial decision of 
whether to provide the benefit at all, and, if so, the value or quantum of 
the benefit to be provided, the government must be obliged to divide the 
pie equally. This means that judicial orders to expand a benefit program 
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(2004), 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) Is Money no Object? 139 
 
may be satisfied by simply redividing the pie; the government must be 
free to reduce the level of the benefit in order to distribute it more 
broadly within the same limited budget.   
If, however, section 15 is interpreted more broadly so as to impose a 
positive obligation on government to establish benefit programs or a 
certain level of benefit in order to reduce or eradicate existing social or 
economic inequalities, then fiscal limits must be a legitimate govern-
ment consideration. Courts can redivide the pie, but they cannot make it 
bigger. 
The first part of this paper summarizes and explores the Court’s de-
cision in Martin.4 We then consider the question of the place of financial 
considerations in the section 1 analysis. After briefly examining the 
approach courts have traditionally taken in non-constitutional cases 
when asked to review government decisions involving budget alloca-
tion, we examine whether this is consistent with the relevance courts 
have given to financial considerations in the section 1 analysis.  
II. NOVA SCOTIA (WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD) V. MARTIN 
In Martin,5 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify its po-
sition regarding whether financial considerations could justify a viola-
tion of section 15 of the Charter.  However, the Court found it 
unnecessary to resolve this important question in this case because it 
found that the evidence did not demonstrate that the infringement was 
compelled by financial considerations. No doubt, the Court was also 
focused on the other important issues raised in Martin, which we exam-
ine below. 
In Martin, the applicants, who both suffered from chronic pain 
caused by work-related injuries, challenged the exclusion of chronic 
pain from the regular workers’ compensation system. In lieu of the 
benefits normally available under the scheme, injured workers suffering 
from chronic pain received only a four-week Restoration Program. The 
applicants argued that this exclusion infringed their section 15 rights and 
that the infringement was not justified under section 1.  However, before 
they could argue the substantive Charter violation, they had to first 
                                                                                                                                
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
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address the argument of whether the Workers’ Compensations Appeal 
Tribunal had jurisdiction to even apply the Charter. 
1. Jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals to Apply the Charter 
 
Thus, the first issue addressed by the Supreme Court was how to de-
termine whether administrative tribunals have jurisdiction to apply the 
Charter. In conjunction with Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals 
Commission)6 released concurrently with Martin on October 3, 2003, 
Martin set a revised and expansive test for determining the constitu-
tional jurisdiction of administrative tribunals. The test established by the 
Court is now that a tribunal that has been granted the power to deter-
mine questions of law — either expressly in its enabling statute or by 
implication — may determine constitutional issues, including both 
Charter and aboriginal rights issues, unless there is a clear implication 
from the statutory scheme to the contrary. 
The Court held that administrative tribunals which have either the 
expressed or implied jurisdiction to consider questions of law arising 
under a challenged provision will be presumed to have the jurisdiction 
to consider whether that provision infringes the Charter. That presump-
tion will only be rebutted if the legislature has removed jurisdiction 
from the tribunal to consider Charter issues. The party challenging the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal to consider constitutional issues has the bur-
den of demonstrating that the legislature intended to remove that juris-
diction, either explicitly or implicitly.  
The Court gave three reasons to support its conclusion that tribunals 
with the power to decide questions of law should be presumed to have 
the jurisdiction to apply the Charter. First, the principle of constitutional 
supremacy in section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 leads to a pre-
sumption that all legal decisions will take into account the supreme law 
                                                                                                                                
6 [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, [2003] S.C.J. No. 34 [hereinafter “Paul”]. In Paul, the Supreme 
Court also came to the important determination that the constitutional division of powers does 
not preclude a provincial government from investing in a provincial tribunal the jurisdiction 
to adjudicate issues of aboriginal rights that arise incidentally to a tribunal’s regulation of a 
provincial matter.  The Court also established that the test to determine whether a provincial 
tribunal has jurisdiction to decide aboriginal rights issues is the same as the jurisdiction to 
consider Charter issues. 
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of the land. Thus, the power to decide a question of law is the power to 
decide by applying valid laws only.  
Second, the factual findings and record compiled by an administra-
tive tribunal, as well as its informed and expert view of the various 
issues raised by a constitutional challenge, will often be invaluable to a 
reviewing court. Finally, allowing tribunals to decide Charter issues 
does not undermine the role of the courts as final arbiters of constitu-
tionality in Canada. Administrative tribunal decisions based on the 
Charter are subject to judicial review on a correctness standard and a 
tribunal’s decision that a provision of its enabling statute is invalid is not 
binding on future decision makers.   
The Court’s ruling on the jurisdiction of administrative tribunals to 
apply the Charter clarifies confusion that remained from its analysis in 
Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board)7 and Cooper v. 
Canada (Human Rights Commission).8 However, with the new test, the 
Court has vastly expanded the number of tribunals that will have juris-
diction to consider the Charter. One issue which remains outstanding is 
when there are parallel proceedings in a tribunal and a court, under what 
circumstances should the tribunal stay its proceedings to defer to the 
court process.   
The test enunciated in Martin and Paul establishes a broad jurisdic-
tion for tribunals to consider constitutional issues. This obviously has 
important implications for government. As stated in Paul, the issue of 
tribunals’ jurisdiction to consider the Constitution, including aboriginal 
rights, is of “great significance both to aboriginal persons and to provin-
cial governments, which enable administrative tribunals to address a 
vast diversity of issues that may encompass s. 35 rights.”9  
The judgments send a clear message that if governments do not 
want a tribunal which has the power to consider questions of law to 
consider Charter or aboriginal rights challenges, it should say so explic-
itly in the tribunal’s enabling statute. However, in Martin and Paul, the 
Supreme Court has clearly stated its preference that administrative tri-
bunals which have the power to determine issues of law should have the 
authority to determine constitutional issues. While the Court suggested 
                                                                                                                                
7  [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5, [1991] S.C.J. No. 42. 
8  [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115. 
9  Paul, supra, note 6, at para. 2. 
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that the question is ultimately one for the legislature to decide, in Mar-
tin, the Court included the following warning: 
 I refrain, however, from expressing any opinion as to the 
constitutionality of a provision that would place procedural barriers in the 
way of claimants seeking to assert their rights in a timely and effective 
manner, for instance by removing Charter jurisdiction from a tribunal 
without providing an effective alternative administrative route for Charter 
claims.10  
Further, the Court stated that Canadians “should be entitled to assert the 
rights and freedoms that the Constitution guarantees them in the most 
accessible forum available, without the need for parallel proceedings 
before the courts.”11 The Court also stated that the accessibility concern 
was particularly pressing given that many administrative tribunals have 
exclusive initial jurisdiction over disputes relating to their enabling 
legislation, so that forcing litigants to refer Charter issues to courts 
would result in costly and time-consuming bifurcation of proceedings. 
The Court’s decision on this point has the benefit of clarifying an area 
of procedure that was beset with convoluted and confusing tests which 
resulted in procedural uncertainty and were often more difficult to apply 
than the Charter itself.  
                                                                                                                                
10  Martin, supra, note 3,  at para. 44, per Gonthier J. This paragraph raises the question 
of whether there exists a right to “an effective alternative administrative remedy for Charter 
claims”, a far cry from the earlier suggestion of former Chief Justice Lamer in Cooper v. 
Canada (Human Rights Commission)  that even permitting tribunals to adjudicate Charter 
claims could be a violation of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers [[1996] 3 
S.C.R. 854, at para. 28, [1996] S.C.J. No. 115]. If there is a right to “effective alternative” 
remedies, it is unclear where in the Charter’s text such a right is found, or, given the right to 
vindicate Charter rights in Court, why an “alternative” forum is necessary. It also ignores the 
important fact that the legislature which establishes the tribunal and its jurisdiction is in the 
best position to determine whether the particular tribunal has the expertise to make a useful 
contribution to the Charter analysis. While the Charter may not be, in the words of McLachlin 
C.J., a “holy grail which only judicial initiates of the superior courts may touch” [Cooper, id., 
at para. 70, per McLachlin J. (as she then was), dissenting], the policy issues which must be 
considered under the Charter are often more complex and far reaching than the kinds of 
decisions many  tribunals are given the jurisdiction to make. 
11  Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 29. 
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2. The Section 15 Issue  
Following its decision on the jurisdictional issue, the Court consid-
ered the merits of the Charter claim. It found that the exclusion of 
chronic pain from the regular compensation scheme in the legislation at 
issue infringed the equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter, find-
ing that the test set out in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration)12 for section 15 claims was satisfied. By entirely exclud-
ing chronic pain from the general compensation provisions, the legisla-
tion at issue imposed differential treatment upon workers suffering from 
chronic pain on the basis of the nature of their physical disability. Fur-
ther, the second branch of the Law test was satisfied as physical disabil-
ity was an enumerated ground in section 15. Finally, this differential 
treatment was discriminatory because it did not correspond to the actual 
needs and circumstances of injured workers suffering from chronic pain. 
Injured workers suffering from chronic pain were deprived of any indi-
vidual assessment of their needs and circumstances and the scheme 
ignored completely the needs of those workers who, despite treatment, 
remained permanently disabled from chronic pain. 
3. The Court’s Section 1 Analysis 
The Court concluded that the violation of section 15 was not justi-
fied under section 1 of the Charter. The government advanced four 
principal objectives, two of which were closely related as they pertained 
to financial considerations. The first stated objective was to maintain the 
financial viability of the Accident Fund, which was not guaranteed be-
cause of the Fund’s considerable accumulated liability. The second was 
to avoid potential fraudulent claims based on chronic pain, which would 
be difficult to detect since no objective findings are available to support 
chronic pain claims.13 
                                                                                                                                
12  [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, [1999] S.C.J. No. 12. 
13  Closely tied to this objective was the need to develop a consistent legislative re-
sponse to the administrative challenges raised by processing chronic pain claims. The final 
objective was to implement early medical intervention and return to work as the optimal 
treatment for chronic pain or as bluntly put by the Attorney General of Nova Scotia “to 
eradicate the dependency on benefits and to motivate return to the workforce” [AGNS factum 
at para. 148; cited by Gonthier J. in Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 108]. 
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The Court dismissed the first objective swiftly. The Court stated: 
 The first concern, maintaining the financial viability of the Accident 
Fund, may be dealt with swiftly. Budgetary considerations in and of 
themselves cannot normally be invoked as a free-standing pressing and 
substantial objective for the purposes of s. 1 of the Charter: see Reference 
re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward 
Island,  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 281; see also Schachter v. Canada,  
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at p. 709. It has been suggested, however, that in 
certain circumstances, controlling expenditures may constitute a pressing 
and substantial objective: see Eldridge, supra, at para. 84. I find it 
unnecessary to decide this point for the purposes of the case at bar. 
Nothing in the evidence establishes that the chronic pain claims in and of 
themselves placed sufficient strain upon the Accident Fund to threaten its 
viability, or that such claims significantly contributed to its present 
unfunded liability. Admittedly, when a court finds the challenged 
legislation to be supported by another, non-financial purpose, budgetary 
considerations may become relevant to the minimal impairment test: see 
P.E.I. Reference, at para. 283. But at the present stage of the analysis, such 
a non-financial purpose remains to be identified.14 
The Court moved on to find that the objective of avoiding fraudulent 
claims based on chronic pain was the strongest objective advanced by 
the government since avoiding such claims would ensure that the re-
sources of the scheme would be properly directed to workers who are 
genuinely unable to work by reason of work-related accident. While 
developing a consistent legislative response to the special issues raised 
by chronic pain claims, such as developing a scheme that avoided 
fraudulent claims, was pressing and substantial, the blanket exclusion of 
chronic pain from the regular compensation scheme did not minimally 
impair the rights of chronic pain sufferers. Further, the deleterious ef-
fects of the challenged provisions clearly outweighed their beneficial 
effects. Since the last two branches of the Oakes15 proportionality test 
were not satisfied, the violation could not be justified under Charter 
section 1. 
The Court obviously did not feel it necessary to examine in detail 
the important issue of the place of financial considerations in the section 
                                                                                                                                
14  Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 109. 
15  R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7. 
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1 analysis. The Court relied on Schachter16 and the Judges’ Reference17 
for the rule that “[b]udgetary considerations in and of themselves cannot 
normally be invoked as a free-standing pressing and substantial objec-
tive for the purposes of s. 1 of the Charter.”18 However, the Court for-
mulated this rule at the same time that it acknowledged the suggestion 
“that in certain circumstances, controlling expenditures may constitute a 
pressing and substantial objective.”19 In our view, the decision of 
whether financial considerations can be a free-standing objective is an 
extremely important decision that will have a profound effect on gov-
ernment decision-making. The Court’s decision not to address this ques-
tion in detail appears to be based on the finding that it was unnecessary 
to decide the point for the purposes of the case at bar since on the record 
there was no evidence to suggest that the chronic pain claims in and of 
themselves threatened the viability of the Accident Fund.  In the rest of 
this paper, we wade into this question, to determine whether and to what 
extent governments should be able to rely on money as an object in the 
section 1 analysis.  
III. THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE REVIEW OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNDING DECISIONS 
Courts have traditionally recognized that government funding deci-
sions are beyond the scope of judicial review. Accordingly, funding and 
resourcing decisions involving public funds have been classified as 
classic “policy” decisions which do not give rise to any cause of action.  
In tort law, the Supreme Court of Canada has distinguished between 
“policy” decisions, which are immune from tort liability and “opera-
tional” matters which are subject to tort liability. In Just v. British Co-
lumbia, the Court reaffirmed the principle that “the Crown is not a 
person and must be free to govern and make true policy decisions with-
out becoming subject to tort liability as a result of these decisions.”20 
                                                                                                                                
16  Schachter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68. 
17  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, 
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, [1997] S.C.J. No. 75. 
18  Martin, supra, note 3, at para. 109. 
19  Martin, id., citing Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
624, at para. 84, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86. 
20  [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228, at 1239, [1989] S.C.J. No. 121. 
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According to the Court “true policy decisions should be exempt from 
tortious claims so that governments are not restricted in making deci-
sions based upon social, political or economic factors.”21 Similarly, the 
Court concluded that “as a general rule, decisions concerning budgetary 
allotments for departments or government agencies will be classified as 
policy decisions.”22 
In Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and 
Highways)23 the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider whether the 
Crown’s decision to maintain the “summer maintenance” schedule for 
road repair in November was a policy or operational decision. In finding 
that it was a policy decision and therefore immune from tort liability, 
the Court summarized the relevant factors that should be considered in 
making a determination of distinguishing between “policy” and “opera-
tions”: 
 True policy decisions involve social, political and economic factors. 
In such decisions, the authority attempts to strike a balance between 
efficiency and thrift, in the context of planning and predetermining the 
boundaries of its undertakings and of their actual performance. True 
policy decisions will usually be dictated by financial, economic, social and 
political factors or constraints.24 
Thus, the fact that government policy takes into account “economic 
factors” and “will usually be dictated by financial, economic social and 
political factors or constraints” is no surprise to the courts. Indeed, it 
would ignore reality to believe that economic or financial constraints are 
not relevant to the policy process. 
Judicial deference to budgetary considerations has also traditionally 
applied in the administrative law context, where the Supreme Court has 
recognized that “governments may be moved by any number of politi-
cal, economic, social or partisan considerations,”25 and has declined to 
review executive action on the basis that the Crown was motivated by 
                                                                                                                                
21  Id., at 1240. 
22  Id., at  1245. 
23  [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420, [1994] S.C.J. No. 20. 
24  Id., at para. 38. 
25  Thorne’s Hardware Limited v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 106, at 112-13. See also 
TransCanada Pipelines Ltd. v. Beardmore (Township) (2000), 186 D.L.R. (4th) 403, [1998] 
O.J. No. 2132 (C.A.). 
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financial or budgetary considerations. For example, in Hamilton-
Wentworth (Regional Municipality) v. Ontario (Ministry of Transporta-
tion),26 the Divisional Court reviewed the decision of the new govern-
ment to deny further funding to the development of an expressway 
project. In rejecting the application for judicial review of the Minister’s 
decision to refuse funding, the Court emphasized that the government 
had the right to order its fiscal priorities and make funding decisions 
according to these priorities: 
 The evidence leads to the conclusion that the decision was one 
announced by the Minister after approval of the Cabinet in substance 
constitutes an expression of the intention of the government not to provide 
any further funding for construction of the project. The government has 
the right to order its priorities and direct its fiscal resources towards those 
initiatives or programs which are most compatible with the policy 
conclusions guiding that particular government’s action. This was simply 
a statement of funding policy and priorities and not the exercise of a 
statutory power of decision attracting judicial review. 
 While it would appear that in basing its decision on environmental 
concerns the government is ignoring the statutory framework established 
to deal with environmental matters, that does not affect its jurisdiction to 
make the decision in question. Such a decision is not subject to judicial 
review. It is in substance a decision for the disbursement of public funds. 
It has been a constitutional principle of our parliamentary system for at 
least three centuries that such disbursement is within the authority of the 
legislature alone. The appropriation, allocation or disbursement of such 
funds by a court is offensive to principle.  
… 
 The nature of the action under review here is, in my view, observably 
and significantly different from those situations where the court requires 
government, be they municipal or provincial, to carry out mandates 
according to law and which require the expenditure of money. The 
decision in issue represents an exercise of the government’s right to 
                                                                                                                                
26  (1991), 2 O.R. (3d) 716 (Div. Ct.); leave to appeal ref’d (1991), 4 Admin. L.R. (2d) 
226 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hamilton-Wentworth”]. See most recently: Byl, Litigation 
Guardian v. Ontario (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 588, at 600, [2003] O.J. No. 3436 (Div. Ct.). 
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allocate its funds as it sees proper. Such a conclusion is essential to the 
parliamentary system of democracy.27 
While courts may review executive action to ensure that it is authorized 
by statute, and to ensure that a statute designated for one purpose is not 
used for a different purpose,28 courts cannot review the annual allocation 
or budget process since this is viewed as a political or policy decision: 
[I]t is not for any court to oversee a Minister of the Crown in policy 
decisions or in the exercise of his or her discretion in the expenditure of 
public funds entrusted to his or her department by the legislature. As 
Grange J. said, “The propriety of the payment or the withholding of 
payment may in some circumstances be inquired into; the wisdom of the 
decision can never be the subject of judicial review. It is a political and 
not a judicial problem”.29 
Another example of a case where a court refused to second guess a 
government policy decision based on fiscal considerations is Masse v. 
Ontario (Ministry of Community and Social Services),30 where the On-
tario Divisional Court was asked to consider whether  budgetary consid-
erations could justify a 21.6 per cent reduction in social assistance 
benefits. The first issue was the administrative law question of whether 
the regulation reducing welfare rates was intra vires the provincial so-
cial assistance legislation. The applicant argued that the regulation was 
ultra vires because the “sole or overriding considerations were provin-
cial debt and provincial deficit and those considerations excluded any 
meaningful consideration for the ‘persons in need’ who are the social 
assistance recipients.”31 The court was also asked to consider whether 
the reduction violated  sections 7 and 15 of the Charter and if so whether 
the reduction could be justified under section 1.  
The government led evidence to establish that in March 31, 1995 
Ontario’s debt had risen to $85.7 billion, the debt/gross domestic prod-
                                                                                                                                
27  Id., at 731-32. 
28  Doctors Hospital v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 164 (C.A.) 
and Multi-Malls Inc. v. (Ontario Minister of Transportation and Communications) (1976), 14 
O.R. (2d) 49 (C.A.). 
29  Hamilton-Wentworth, supra, note 26, at 733, citing Metropolitan General Hospital v. 
Ontario (Minister of Health) (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 699, at 705 (H.C.). 
30  (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 20, [1996] O.J. No. 363 (Div. Ct.). 
31  Id., at 36. 
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uct (GGDP) ratio to over 30 per cent, and the budget deficit in 1994-95 
to $10.1 billion.32 The government’s expert, Professor Jack Carr of the 
Department of Economics at the University of Toronto provided the 
following evidence: 
Clearly this process of ever increasing deficits and debts cannot go on 
forever. Government borrowing power ultimately depends on its ability to 
tax. There is a finite limit to the amount governments can tax; hence there 
is a finite limit to the amount government can borrow. This finite 
borrowing limit is known as the debt wall. As a government approaches 
the debt wall interest rates rise and eventually both foreign and domestic 
lenders refuse to take any more debt and a debt crisis occurs.33 
The court rejected the administrative law challenge. The court accepted 
that “the evidence showed that there are serious problems with the debt 
level of the Ontario government and serious concern was being ex-
pressed  by economists with respect to these levels. The credit rating of 
the Ontario government has been falling and that drastic action to deal 
with those financial problems is required.”34 The Court accepted that 
“debt and deficit” played a role in the decision to enact the impugned 
regulation, but concluded that “fiscal considerations are part and parcel 
of the policy and objects”35 of the legislation and their consideration 
could not render the regulations invalid. 
The majority of the court found it unnecessary to consider the im-
portance of funding considerations in the section 1 analysis, concluding 
that there was no infringement of either section 7 or 15 of the Charter. 
Justice Corbett agreed with respect to Charter section 7, but dissented on 
Charter section 15 as the regulation did not exempt the temporarily 
disabled or sole-support parents of pre-school age children from the 
general reduction. While she acknowledged that the objectives of the 
regulation in reducing the levels of social assistance were pressing and 
substantial she concluded that failure to exempt the temporarily disabled 
and sole-support parents with pre-school children was not rationally 
connected to those objectives because those groups were not “employ-
                                                                                                                                
32  Id., at 27. 
33  Id. 
34  Id., at 54. 
35  Id., at 37. 
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able” and could not offset the effects of the reduction through employ-
ment.36 
In all of these cases the issue is the perceived adequacy of the fund-
ing available to a particular government program or service. But “ade-
quacy” is ultimately a political assessment, not a legal concept, and 
there are no judicially manageable standards by which a court can de-
termine what level of funding is adequate. The demand for many gov-
ernment services like education and health care is virtually limitless, and 
the correct answer to this kind of policy question depends more on po-
litical or economic philosophy than legal analysis. 
Given these principles of tort and administrative law, government 
budget allocation decisions have been appropriately viewed as politi-
cal/policy decisions and have generally not attracted judicial interfer-
ence. The limits of government expenditure, and the incidence of tax 
burden, which necessarily accompanies government expenditure, have 
always been seen as matters of political judgment for elected officials 
and not matters for judges.37 Courts have therefore been reluctant to 
adjudicate claims for additional government resources. 
IV. SHOULD GOVERNMENTS BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY LIMITS ON 
SECTION 15 CHARTER RIGHTS ON THE BASIS OF  
FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS?  
The section 1 analysis applicable to a limit on legislation con-
ferrring financial benefits requires courts to consider both the purpose 
for providing the benefit, as well as the purpose for limiting the benefit. 
The importance of considering both legislative objectives was explained 
by Bastarache J. in his concurring opinion in M v. H.:  
 The necessity of this approach also emerges from the particular 
nature of most social legislation conferring benefits.  The reason for this 
                                                                                                                                
36  Id., at 95. 
37  Similar statements have been made in the context of English administrative law. See 
for example R. v. Cambridge Health Authority, [1995] 2 All E.R. 129, at 137 (C.A.), per Sir 
Thomas Birmingham M.R.: 
Difficult and agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is 
best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. This 
is not  a judgment which the court can make. 
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approach is clear.  The Oakes analysis presupposes a tension between the 
objectives of the Charter right and the objectives of the particular 
legislative provision that is alleged to constitute a violation of the Charter 
guarantee.  Only after that tension is identified does it make sense to ask 
whether that legislative objective is pressing and substantial, and whether 
the precise means adopted are so closely related and narrowly tailored to 
that objective as to warrant derogation from the Charter guarantee. If the 
tension of objectives is removed, then almost any exclusion that detracts 
from the ambit of the broad legislative goal will fail the s. 1 test, because, 
simply by virtue of being an exclusion, it cannot be rationally connected 
with the goal.  Only when the specific purpose or objective of the 
exclusion is articulated are the tests under Oakes … properly engaged.  
This is particularly true in cases involving the guarantee of equality.  
Unlike most legislation which infringes ss. 2(a), (b), (d) and 7 to 14 of the 
Charter, the broad purposes of entitlement-granting legislation will 
seldom come into conflict with s. 15. Usually, the purposes are perfectly 
congruent and it is necessary to articulate the purpose of the limitation in 
order to identify the underlying tension between the legislative purpose 
and the Charter. 
 Another danger in not rigorously following this approach is the 
tendency to suggest that nothing is taken away from the included class by 
making others eligible for the benefit.  Such a formulation misses the 
point.  The issue under s. 1 is whether the government acted in a 
reasonable fashion in limiting the class based on one of the prohibited 
enumerated or analogous characteristics described in s. 15. That requires 
an analysis of its reasons for limiting the class as it did.  If the government 
had a valid reason for limiting the class, and it used means which were 
proportional to this objective, then the limitation on the equality rights of 
those excluded is justified.  Whether anything is taken away from the 
included class is entirely irrelevant.  The inquiry is not into a possible 
detriment to the included class. [Emphasis added.]38 
We agree with Bastarache J. that the detriment to the included class 
was entirely irrelevant in the context of M. v. H.39 Expanding the defini-
tion of “spouse” to include gay and lesbian partners could take nothing 
away from heterosexual spouses because “spousal status” is not a lim-
                                                                                                                                
38  [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 333-34, [1999] S.C.J. No. 23. See also Egan v. Canada, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, at para. 106, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43. 
39  As stated by Bastarache J., the appropriate inquiry focuses exclusively on whether 
the government had valid reasons for limiting the included class. The reference to “valid 
reasons” for a decision to limit the included class may include financial reasons. See M. v. H., 
supra, note 38, at para. 329. 
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ited resource. However, in some cases expanding benefits to other 
classes may cause a detriment to the included class. In those cases, the 
detriment to the included class may prove to be extremely relevant.40   
Whether “anything is taken away from the included class” will be 
relevant in those circumstances where the benefit is a limited resource. 
Take for example a benefit like public housing which has a limited 
number of units and long waiting lists, or certain medical procedures 
where the professional expertise is in  short supply and long waiting lists 
result. Expanding the eligible beneficiaries in such cases does not result 
in an expansion of the available benefits — it results only in the expan-
sion of the waiting list. Any expansion of the waiting list will be to the 
detriment of the included class because its members will receive their 
benefit later or perhaps not at all. 
If the government objective in this situation is to allocate the limited 
resource to those most in need, or those who will benefit the most,41 
then (assuming we are into Charter section 1) the detriment to the in-
cluded class is extremely relevant to the section 1 analysis. Expanding 
the class of beneficiaries in these circumstances may well defeat or 
undermine the government’s objective. Courts cannot pretend that there 
are unlimited resources, nor can waiting lists be made to disappear by 
judicial declaration. 
                                                                                                                                
40  While the last two sentences of the passage quoted above are open to different inter-
pretation, it is clear to us that read in context, Bastarache J.’s statement that “the inquiry is not 
into a possible detriment to the included class” was made in reference to the arguments raised 
in M. v. H. and should not be construed as meaning that in a case where the included class is 
negatively affected, the government cannot rely on that fact. 
41  The principles which may apply to the allocation of scarce resources in the context of 
health care has engendered a considerable body of literature. Bioethicists debate whether 
priority should be given to the sickest and most disabled, or to those who may be less sick but 
are more likely to have better outcomes. Should, for example, government allocate limited 
health resources to provide an aggregation of modest benefit to larger numbers of people, or 
more significant benefit to fewer people? These difficult questions are all based on the prem-
ise that there are not enough resources to provide unlimited health care to everyone, and 
government must make macroallocation decisions when it determines the health care budget.  
Some limits are based on limited human resources (not enough medical specialists), some on 
limited funds, and some on a shortage of finite resources (e.g., organs for transplant), al-
though these limits are interrelated. See e.g.,: N. Daniels, Just Health Care (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985); M. McKneally, B. Dickens, E. Meslin, and P. Singer, 
“Bioethics for Clinicians: Resource Allocation” (1997) 157 C.M.A.J. 163. See also the 
Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values, The Future of 
Health Care in Canada, Final Report, November 2002 (Romanow Commission Report). 
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It must be emphasized at the outset that every benefit program es-
tablished by government has at least two objectives: the first, most ob-
vious one is to extend benefits to a group of eligible persons. However, 
every government program, no matter how deserving the cause may be, 
has a finite budget which limits the scope and capacity of the program. 
That fact has become increasingly relevant in view of the modern reali-
ties, where the debts of provincial and federal governments have in-
creased steadily in the last 20 years.42  Thus, the second, less obvious, 
but equally important objective of benefit programs is to limit the poten-
tial costs of the program. Every government benefit program, be it 
health, education or social services, could undoubtedly be improved or 
expanded if it had additional funding, but the reality is that governments 
have finite resources and this necessarily influences the parameters and 
scope of the final policy.  
This latter point was recognized by Bastarache J. in his concurring 
opinion in M. v. H. where he stated: 
The reason for the limitation do not always flow logically from the 
reasons for inclusion. For example, the scope of many acts granting 
financial benefits are circumscribed by a government’s need to operate 
within fiscal constraints. Such a concern is usually totally separate and 
distinct from the reasons for granting a benefit in the first place.43 
If courts focus only on the purpose for granting the benefit, every limit 
has the potential to fail the rational basis test in the section 1 analysis. If 
benefits are good, then more benefits must be even better, and any limit 
or restriction seems to be inconsistent with the purpose of the benefit. 
That is why courts must consider the reason for the limitation as part of 
the section 1 analysis.  
In assessing those limits and determining its priorities, the govern-
ment has the advantage of hearing from a myriad of potential beneficiar-
ies, each with a legitimate, even compelling, argument for a greater 
share of limited resources. Legislatures must pass an annual budget, and 
must consider all of these claims in determining whether to expand or 
establish particular benefit programs. In contrast, courts are presented 
                                                                                                                                
42  Ontario’s debt now exceeds $100 billion. See Ontario Judges’ Association v. Ontario 
(2004), 67 O.R. (3d) 641, at 666 (C.A.). 
43  M. v. H., supra, note 38, at para. 329. 
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with only one potential beneficiary or group of beneficiaries, and can-
not, therefore, make principled prioritization decisions.44  
Even in the Charter context the Supreme Court has recognized that 
it is not in the best position to make the inherently complex policy deci-
sions relating to the allocation of scarce resources in society. For exam-
ple, in Irwin Toy v. Quebec (Attorney General)45 the Court recognized 
that governments may set limits based on the allocation of scarce re-
sources and a reasonable evaluation of conflicting scientific research 
without the courts second-guessing  that decision: 
Where the legislature mediates between the competing claims of different 
groups in the community, it will inevitably be called upon to draw a line 
marking where one set of claims legitimately begins and the other fades 
away without access to complete knowledge as to its precise location. If 
the legislature has made a reasonable assessment as to where the line is 
most properly drawn, especially if that assessment involves weighing 
conflicting scientific evidence and allocating scarce resources on this 
basis, it is not for the court to second guess. That would only be to 
substitute one estimate for another.46 
Another example of this deference to government decisions regard-
ing resource allocation is found in R. v. Askov, where the Court stated : 
Wise political decisions will be required with regard to the allocation of 
scarce funds. Due deference will have to be given to those political 
decisions, as the provision of courtroom facilities and Crown Attorneys 
must, for example, be balanced against the provision of health care and 
highways.47 
In Schachter v. Canada, in the context of its remedial analysis, the 
Supreme Court recognized that budget constraints are relevant in the 
determination of a proper remedy:  
 Even where extension by reading in can be used to further the 
legislative objective through the very means the legislature has chosen, to 
                                                                                                                                
44  For a discussion of this concern in the context of health care, see: D. Greschner and 
S. Lewis, “Auton and Evidence-Based Decision Making: Medicare and the Courts” (2003) 82 
Can. Bar Rev. 501. 
45  [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [1989] S.C.J. No. 36. 
46  Id., at 990. 
47  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199, at 1224, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106. 
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do so may, in some cases, involve an intrusion into budgetary 
considerations which cannot be supported. This Court has held, and 
rightly so, that budgetary considerations cannot be used to justify a 
violation under s. 1. However such considerations are clearly relevant 
once a violation which does not survive s.1 has been clearly established, s. 
52 is determined to have been engaged and the Court turns its attention to 
what action should be taken thereunder. 
 Any remedy granted by a court will have some budgetary 
repercussions whether it be a saving of money or an expenditure of 
money. Striking down or severance may well lead to an expenditure of 
money…. In determining whether reading in is appropriate then, the 
question is not whether courts can make decisions that impact on 
budgetary policy; it is to what degree they can appropriately do so. A 
remedy which entails an intrusion into this sphere so substantial as to 
change the nature of the scheme in question is clearly inappropriate.48 
As indicated in Martin49 the legitimacy of government expenditure 
control was recognized by the Supreme Court in Egan v. Canada.50 In 
that case, the majority of the Supreme Court found the exclusion of 
same sex partners from the old age security regime violated section 15, 
but a differently constituted majority found that the exclusion was justi-
fied under Charter section 1. In reaching that conclusion, the Court 
accepted budgetary concerns as relevant to the determination of a press-
ing and substantial objective. Justice Sopinka explained why funding 
concerns should be considered in the section 1 analysis: 
It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited funds to 
address the needs of all. A judicial approach on this basis would tend to 
make a government reluctant to create any new social benefit schemes 
because their limits would depend on an accurate prediction of the 
outcome of court proceedings under s. 15(1) of the Charter.  The problem 
is identified by Professor Hogg in Constitutional Law of Canada (3rd ed. 
1992), at pp. 911-12, where he states: 
It seems likely that virtually any benefit programme could be held to 
be under-inclusive in some respect.  The effect of Schachter and 
Tétreault-Gadoury is to subject benefit programmes to unpredictable 
potential liabilities. These decisions by-pass the normal processes by 
                                                                                                                                
48  [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 709-10, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68. 
49  [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54. 
50  [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513, [1995] S.C.J. No. 43. 
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which a government sets its priorities and obtains parliamentary 
approval of its estimates. 
This Court has recognized that it is legitimate for the government to make 
choices between disadvantaged groups and that it must be provided with 
some leeway to do so.51 
This observation is undoubtedly correct. Governments must approach 
the creation of any new social benefit programs or affirmative action 
plans with great reluctance if courts ignore the reality of fiscal limita-
tions.  Faced with a choice of “all or nothing at all,” governments con-
cerned with mounting debt and deficit might well prefer the latter. 
In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General),52 the Supreme 
Court was asked whether the provincial government’s failure to provide 
sign language interpretation services for deaf persons was an unjustified 
violation of section 15 of the Charter. In its section 1 analysis, the Court 
emphasized that the estimated cost of providing sign language interpre-
tation services in British Columbia was only approximately $150,000, 
and expressed doubt that its decision would lead to the proliferation of 
interpretation services for non-official linguistic minorities. These 
statements do indicate that the Supreme Court recognizes that at some 
point cost does matter. Justice La Forest, for a unanimous Court, ex-
plained that governments must have flexibility in allocating resources:  
The Court has also held that where the legislation under consideration 
involves the balancing of competing interests and matters of social policy, 
the Oakes test should be applied flexibly, and not formally or 
mechanistically…. It is also clear that while financial considerations alone 
may not justify Charter infringements…, governments must be afforded 
wide latitudes to determine the proper distribution of resources in 
society…. This is especially true where Parliament, in providing specific 
social benefits, has to choose between disadvantaged groups.53  
                                                                                                                                
51  Id., at paras. 104-105. 
52  [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, [1997] S.C.J. No. 86. 
53  Id., at para. 85 [citations omitted, emphasis added]. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In our view, the significance of constraints on government funding 
depends on the proper conception of the Charter. In her article in this 
volume, Professor Sheppard describes the different conceptions of 
equality ranging from classical liberalism/formal equality, to visions 
of substantive equality which “would challenge some of the funda-
mental economic and political pillars of modern society.”54 To the 
extent that courts move to the latter vision of equality which imposes a 
positive obligation on governments to reduce or eliminate all forms of 
social and economic inequality, the ability of government to rely on 
funding considerations as a “free standing pressing and substantial 
objective for the purposes of section 1 of the Charter” becomes essen-
tial. If courts take on a policy-making role, they must think and act 
like legislators and give serious consideration to the financial implica-
tions of their decisions. 
 
                                                                                                                                
54  C. Sheppard, “Inclusive Equality and New Forms of Social Governance” (2004) 24 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 45. 
 
 
 
